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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 20030579-CA

ALBERT DENNIS ZAMPEDRI,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * is

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for attempted aggravated murder, a first degree
felony, and attempted murder, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 765-202 (Supp. 2001), § 76-5-203 (Supp. 2000), & § 76-4-101 (1999). The Utah Supreme
Court transferred the appeal to this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1996).
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Did the trial court properly instruct the jury that defendant could be convicted of
attempted aggravated murder, or alternatively, of attempted murder, if he "knowingly or
intentionally" attempted to cause the deaths of the two officers?
Standard of Review. Where no objection is made at trial to jury instructions, this
Court will review those instructions on appeal only "to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah R.

Crim. P. 19(e); accord State v. Casey, 2003 UT 33, «|[ 39, 82 P.3d 1106. Manifest justice is
determined using the plain error standard. Casey, 2003 UT 33, ^ 40-41.
2. Was the evidence sufficient for the jury to find that defendant acted with the
mental states required for attempted aggravated murder and attempted murder?
Standard of Review. Where the sufficiency of the evidence is not challenged at trial,
this Court will review an appellate challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence only for plain
error. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,ffi[16-17, 10 P.3d 346.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999) is relevant to a determination
of this case, as is section 76-4-101 as amended by S.B. 143,2004 Utah Legislative Session,
which was enacted to clarify the original statute. 2004 Utah Laws Ch. 154 (S.B. 143) (eff.
May 2,2004) is reproduced in Addendum A. The original statute and the amended statute
are set forth below:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999)
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the
commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial
step toward commission of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense.
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise:
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them
to be.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (as amended by 2004 Utah Laws Ch. 154 (S.B. 143))
(1) For purposes of this part, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime if he:
(a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward
commission of the crime; and
(b)(i) intends to commit the crime; or
(ii) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he
acts with an awareness that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause
that result.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial step if it
strongly corroborates the actor's mental state as defined in Subsection (l)(b).
(3) A defense to the offense of attempt does not arise:
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been
committed if the attendant circumstances had been as the actor believed
them to be.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

Defendant was charged with two counts of attempted aggravated murder, both first
degree felonies, and misdemeanor counts of assault, possession of a dangerous weapon with
intent to assault, and carrying a dangerous weapon while under the influence of alcohol or
drugs. R. 1-3. Defendant was bound over for trial on all charges. R. 17-19; R. 242: 49.
Following a four-day trial, a jury found defendant guilty of attempted aggravated murder and
attempted murder. R. 147,243-46. The jury found defendant not guilty of assault. R. 148,
243-46. Defendant was not tried on the remaining two misdemeanor counts. See R. 147-48.
Defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of five years-to-life for attempted
aggravated murder and one-to-fifteen years for attempted murder. R. 169-70. Defendant
timely moved for a new trial, alleging that his counsel was ineffective for not pursuing a
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particular defense. R. 172-78. The motion was denied. R. 221-28. Defendant timely filed a
notice of appeal. R. 218, 233-35. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (2002).
SUMMARY OF FACTS

On November 16, 2001, defendant was released from the Weber County Correctional
Facility after having served a six-month jail term. R. 244: 51-52; R. 245: 188. While in jail,
both his home and business went into foreclosure. R. 244: 52-53, 82; R. 245: 185, 188-89.
At the request of defendant's son and estranged wife, defendant's neighbors—Richard and
Sharlene Malan—helped move some of defendant's property and equipment from both the
business and the home. R. 244: 81. They also cured the default on defendant's home by
arranging with his estranged wife to purchase the home. R. 244: 82-85, 88, 97, 103.
However, defendant did not agree to the sale and accused the Malans of stealing his property.
R. 244: 87-88, 96-101.
On December 2,2001, about two weeks after his release, defendant flagged down the
Malans as they were returning home from church in their pickup truck. R. 243: 101; R. 244:
56-58, 89-90. The conversation was pleasant at first, as the two men discussed the
whereabouts of defendant's tools and equipment. R. 244: 59, 91. However, in the midst of
that discussion, defendant looked at Mrs. Malan and asked, "What is wrong with you?" R.
244: 59, 91. She replied that she wanted the $9,400 back that the Malans had paid on
defendant's house. R. 244: 60, 91. Defendant turned around, stuffed a handful of snow in
his mouth, turned back around, and declared, "I'm so mad I could just piss." R. 244: 64, 92.
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Mr. Malan replied, "Go ahead," to which defendant replied, "You want me to rip this door
open and kick your ass?" R. 244: 64, 92. He then opened the truck door and tried to pull
Malan out of the truck. R. 243: 101-02; R. 244: 65, 92. Mr. Malan grabbed defendant and
pushed him against the steering wheel. R. 244: 65-66, 93. When defendant went limp, Mr.
Malan let him go, whereupon defendant left the truck and disappeared behind his house. R.
244:66-67,93. During the struggle between the two men, Mrs. Malan telephoned 9-1-1 and
reported the assault. R. 244: 92.
Officers Gary Worthen of the Harrisville Police Department and Corey Clark of the
Pleasant View Police Department both arrived at the scene some five to ten minutes later. R.
243: 91, 94-95, 97; R. 244: 67-68, 95, 108. After Officer Worthen talked to Mrs. Malan
about what happened, he attempted to contact defendant by knocking on his front door. R.
243:102-03; R. 244:110-12. When no one responded, Officer Clarkjoined Officer Worthen
at the front steps and reported that Mrs. Malan said that defendant had entered in through the
back door. R. 243: 103; R. 244: 112. The two officers walked around the house and
knocked on the back door, but again no one responded. R. 243:105-08; R. 244:68-69,11214. Officer Worthen noticed fresh footprints in the snow leading away from the house. R.
243: 108; R. 244: 114. After instructing Officer Clark to remain at the house, Officer
Worthen followed the footprints through the gate to a chicken coop. R. 243:109-11; R. 244:
15, 116-17.
Removing his pistol and hiding it beside his leg, Officer Worthen approached the
chicken coop and called out to defendant. R. 243: 114-15; R. 244: 17, 117. When no one
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answered, he opened the door to the chicken coop about half-way and stepped in. R. 243:
113-17; R. 244: 17, 117. As he scanned the chicken coop, defendant arose from behind a
barrier of miscellaneous objects with a .32 caliber rifle to his shoulder, which he pointed
directly at Officer Worthen's face. R.243:117-18,121,132; R. 244:18-19,247; R. 245:43,
77. Officer Worthen immediately dropped to the ground. R.243: 123,127; R. 244: 39. As
Officer Worthen dropped to the ground, defendant fired the gun at him, but missed. R. 243:
123-24; R. 244: 11, 118; R. 245: 76-77, 99-100, 119-20. Defendant fired his rifle a second
time, again missing. R. 243: 124-25,134; R. 244: 69. Officer Worthen returned fire twice,
scrambled to his feet, shot a third round toward defendant as cover, and fled from the
chicken coop. R. 243: 124-25, 128-29,134; R. 244: 69, 119-20, 133; R. 245: 63. After
taking cover behind a nearby tree, Officer Worthen radioed that shots had been fired. R.
243: 130-31; R. 244:143. On hearing the shots, Officer Clark scrambled for cover behind a
corner of the house and likewise reported the shooting. R. 244: 120, 122, 133.
Defendant sporadically fired his gun toward the officers. R. 243: 134-36; R. 244:25,
121, 129-30, 138, 192-94, 222. One round went through the passenger- and driver-side
windows ofOfficer Clark's patrol car and hit a house. R.243:134-36; R. 244:25,121,12930,138,192-94, 222; R. 245: 59-65. When Officer Clark peeked around the corner to see if
he could locate Officer Worthen, defendant fired the rifle at him, narrowly missing his head
and hitting the brick instead. R. 243: 137-42; R. 244: 123-26, 133-37, 141-42; R. 245: 58.
For close to an hour, Officer Worthen tried to negotiate defendant's surrender. R.
243: 133, 144; R. 244: 120-21, 181-82. Using a torrent of vulgarities, defendant refused,
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repeatedly threatening to shoot Officer Worthen and maintaining that the officer would have
to come in and get him. R. 243: 143-45; R. 244: 24-25, 36, 122, 131-32, 139-40, 224. In
response to Officer Worthen's queries about defendant's well-being, defendant alternately
claimed that he had been shot and that he had not been shot. R. 244: 153-54. Defendant
further complained that police had "taken everything away" from him. R. 243: 144-45; R.
244: 24-25, 36, 122,131-32,139-40,148-49,181-82, 224. Although defendant also stated
that he wanted to die, he never presented himself to be shot by police. R. 243: 132-34,146;
R.244: 128, 181,226.
When Chief Max Jackson arrived on the scene, defendant agreed to speak with him.
R.243:146-48; R.244: 125-26,221,225. Chief Jackson joined Officer Worthen behind the
tree and attempted to negotiate defendant's surrender. R. 243:149-50; R. 244:182,225-26.
Defendant rebuffed Chief Jackson's attempts, demanding that "you f.'ers just come in here
andgetme." Rv243: 150-51; R. 244: 182-83,226-27. When it became evident that he was
making no progress with defendant, Chief Jackson retreated from his position at the tree and
drove to the police station about two blocks away where he briefed the S.W.A.T. commander
and met with a crisis negotiator. R. 243: 150-51; R. 244: 182-83, 227-28. A few minutes
later, Officer Worthen also retreated from the scene and joined Chief Jackson at the station.
R. 243: 151-52; R. 244: 183-84, 228.
Chief Jackson returned to the scene approximately twenty minutes later. R. 244:228.
Another hour or so later—after the S.W.A.T. team was in position and one of defendant's
friends had arrived—Chief Jackson entered defendant's home and reinitiated contact with
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him through a bullhorn. R. 244: 165-66, 184-85,216,228-31. During this time, defendant
complained that he had lost everything, spewed a "hail of expletives," and blamed the
Harrisville Police Department, particularly Chief Jackson, for his troubles. R. 244:165-66,
231-32. Chief Jackson told defendant that they could work things out, but defendant would
not surrender—afraid that police would shoot him if he did. R. 244: 186-88.
After some thirty to forty minutes, Chief Jackson gave the bullhorn to defendant's
friend, who also asked defendant to put his gun down and come out. R. 244: 185-186,23233. At first, defendant asked that his friend leave, but he was eventually persuaded to come
out after his friend came outside. R. 244:185-86,233-34. Defendant emerged from the door
with his hands above his head, but as he did so, he removed a .22 pistol from a shoulder
holster. R.244:166-67,188-89,200-01,212,234-35. Several officers immediately alerted
that he had a gun and Chief Jackson yelled at him to put it down. R. 244: 167-68, 189,23435. Defendant ran back inside the coop exclaiming, "No, no, no, I'm just going to put the
gun down." R. 244: 167-68, 189, 234-35.
After defendant retreated into the chicken coop, Chief Jackson resumed negotiations.
R. 244: 168-69, 190. Chief Jackson told defendant that since he had not shot anyone, they
would let him off with a citation. R. 244: 170, 187-88, 238. After some twenty minutes of
further negotiation, defendant stepped out of the chicken coop with his hands in the air, again
expressing fear for his safety because of all the weapons aimed at him. R. 244: 238. Chief
Jackson reassured defendant they would not shoot him. R. 244:23 8-40. Defendant became
alarmed, however, when he saw additional officers with their sights trained on him. R. 244:
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240-41. Chief Jackson directed the officers to bring their guns to "low ready." R. 244:241.
When defendant insisted that Chief Jackson come out, he was directed to lift his vest so
officers could verify he had no concealed weapons. R. 244: 241. Chief Jackson and
defendant then walked toward each other until they met and shook hands. R. 244:169,19091,208-09,241-42.
As they shook hands, two members of the S.W.A.T. team advanced on the shed. R.
244:209. When defendant saw them, he turned, took a couple of steps back, and demanded
that they stay away from his guns. R. 244: 209, 242. At that point, Chief Jackson and a
number of other officers converged on defendant and arrested him. R. 244: 156,169,19192, 209, 243-44. During his takedown, defendant appeared to reach for a knife that he
carried in a sheath, but was prevented from doing so by Chief Jackson. R. 244: 243-44.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Attempt Instructions. Defendant contends that his convictions should be reversed
because the jury was instructed that he could be convicted upon a finding that he
"intentionally or knowingly" attempted to cause the deaths of the officers. Because he did
not object to the instructions, defendant must demonstrate that (1) an error occurred, (2) the
error was obvious, and (3) the error was prejudicial. He has met none of the requirements.
Although the Utah Supreme Court has subsequently held that attempted murder
requires an "intentional" mens rea showing, the legislature has since amended the attempt
statute to clarify that attempt can be found upon a mens rea showing of either intentional or
knowing. Because the amendment is a clarifying amendment, it is applied retroactively in
9

this case. As such, the trial court committed no error. Assuming arguendo that the court
erred in its instructions to the jury, any such error was not obvious. The supreme court's
decision holding that an attempt can only be committed upon a showing of intentional
conduct was issued after the trial in this case. As such, the trial court was guided by
decisions dating back twenty years that recognized an "intentional or knowing" attempted
murder. Accordingly, any error was not obvious. Finally, defendant was not harmed in any
event because only two version of facts was presented to the jury. The State claimed that
defendant intended to cause the officers' deaths and defendant claimed that he shot away
from the officers hoping they would be provoked into shooting him. No evidence was
presented supporting a theory that defendant knew he would kill the officers hoping they
would subsequently shoot him.
Sufficiency of the Evidence. Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to
establish the mens rea element for attempted murder. This claim also fails. Before the
officers' arrival, defendant armed himself with two loaded firearms and additional
ammunition and retreated into a chicken coop behind some barrels. Defendant fired at both
officers, narrowly missing them. Defendant also challenged the officers to come in and get
him. His language and tone was menacing and combative. Finally, he repeatedly told one of
the officers that he was going to shoot him. The foregoing evidence was more than
sufficient to establish that defendant acted knowingly and intentionally. Accordingly,
defendant's plain error and ineffective assistance claims based on insufficient evidence fail.
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ARGUMENT
NO MANIFEST INJUSTICE RESULTED FROM THE TRIAL
COURT'S INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY THAT ATTEMPT MAY
INCLUDE ONLY A "KNOWING" MENS REA.
Defendant claims that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that it could
convict defendant of the attempted aggravated murders, or alternatively, the attempted
murders, of Officers Worthen and Clark if it found, among other things, that he
"intentionally or knowingly" attempted to cause the officers' deaths. Aplt. Brf. at 20,25-32;
see R. 104-12, 126 (Instr. 13-15, 29). Defendant acknowledges that this claim was not
preserved below. Aplt. Brf. at 29-31. However, he asserts that he is entitled to relief under
the "manifest injustice" exception. Aplt. Brf. at 29-32. He is incorrect.1
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that "[u]nless a party objects to an
instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may not be assigned as error
except to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e). In State v. Casey, 2003 UT
33, 82 P.3d 1106 {Casey II), the Utah Supreme Court held that when reviewing a claim of
manifest injustice under rule 19(e), the appellate court "examines the contested jury
instructions under the plain error test.. .." 2003 UT 33, f 41. Under that test, the appellant

A defendant may also obtain appellate review of an unpreserved claim upon a
showing of "exceptional circumstances." State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, \ 16,497
Utah Adv. Rep. 23. Defendant has not, however, asserted "exceptional circumstances" and
this Court should not therefore address that exception on appeal. See State v. Hodges, 2002
UT 117, | 5, 63 P.3d 66 (refusing to address defendant's unpreserved constitutional claim
because defendant had asserted neither exception on appeal).
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must demonstrate that: "(i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, [the Court's] confidence in
the verdict is undermined." The Supreme Court in Casey II emphasized that the appellate
court "will remand [the] case for a new trial only if each element of the test is met" Id.
(emphasis added).
Like defendant here, the appellant in Casey //challenged, for the first time on appeal,
a jury instruction instructing the jury that it could convict the defendant of attempted murder
if it found that he "intentionally or knowingly" attempted to cause the death of another. Id.
at f 43 (emphasis in original). And like the appellant in Casey II, defendant cannot meet all
three requirements of the plain error test.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR.

In State v. Casey, 2001 UT App 205, 29 P.3d 25 {Casey /), decided June 28, 2001,
this Court held that "the required mental state for attempted murder under section 76-5203(l)(a) is 'intent or knowledge.'" Casey /, 2001 UT App 205, \ 27. A little more than
two years later—after the trial in this case—theUtah Supreme Court in Casey II overruled
that holding, concluding that "in order to convict a defendant of attempted murder, the
prosecution must establish that the defendant acted intentionally; it is not enough that he or
she acted knowingly." Casey II, 2003 UT 33,ffif38, 5 1 }

Casey //was originally filed on September 9,2001. An amended opinion was filed
on December 5, 2003.
12

The State acknowledges that under Casey II, an "intentional" mens rea showing is
required to convict someone of attempted murder. However, recent legislation amending the
attempt statute requires a different result. Although the amendment was introduced and took
effect after Casey II, it applies retroactively to this case because it merely clarified the
ambiguities in the original statute.
As a general rule, amendments to existing laws are understood as "changing existing
legal rights and liabilities" and may not be applied retroactively. State v. Amador, 804 P.2d
1233,1234 (Utah App. 1990); accordUteh Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (2000) (providing that "[n]o
part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared"). However, an
exception to this rule exists "when the purpose of an amendment is to clarify the meaning of
an earlier enactment." Dep't of* Social Services v. Higgs, 656P.2d998, 1001 (Utah 1982).
An amendment "not expressly characterized as a clarification carries the rebuttable
presumption that it is intended to change existing legal rights and liabilities." Amador, 804
P.2d at 1234. On the other hand, an amendment will be interpreted as a clarification of the
law and applied retroactively if it is expressly characterized as a clarification in the
legislation or if the presumption against such a characterization is rebutted by other evidence
of legislative intent. See id. at 1234; State v. Grate, 947 P.2d 1161, 1167 & n.4 (Utah App.
1997) (looking to legislative comments in deciding that amendments clarified existing law).
In the legislative session following Casey II, the Utah Legislature amended the
attempt statute. See S.B. 143, 2004 General Session (enrolled copy) (eff. May 3, 2004),
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available at http://www.le.state.ut.us/-2004/bills/sbillenr/sb0143 .htm (Addendum A). The
original attempt statute, interpreted by the Casey II court, stated:
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the
commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial
step toward commission of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(l)-(2) (1999). The amended statute, which took effect on May
3, 2004, provides:
(1) For purposes of this part, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime if he:
(a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission
of the crime; and
(b) (i) intends to commit the crime; or
(ii) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he acts
with an awareness that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause that
result.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial step if it
strongly corroborates the actor's mental state as defined in Subsection (l)(b).
S.B. 143.3 The amended statute thus abrogates the holding in Casey II, permitting a
conviction for attempt where a defendant acts either "intentionally" or "knowingly."
The express language of the bill adopting the amendment and the historical
circumstances giving rise to its passage demonstrate that the amendment did not change
substantive law, but clarified the meaning of the original statute.

Other stylistic changes were made in subsection (3) of the statute. See S.B. 143.
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In its preamble introducing the amendment, the bill states:
General Description:
This bill clarifies the elements of an attempt to commit an offense.
Highlighted Provisions:
This bill:
• clarifies that an attempt to commit a crime includes situations where the
defendant is aware that his actions are reasonably certain to cause a result that
is an element of the offense; and
• clarifies that a defendant's conduct constitutes a substantial step toward
committing a crime if the conduct strongly corroborates the defendant's
awareness of his actions as described above.
S.B. 143 (emphases added). The bill, therefore, explicitly characterized the amendment as a
clarification. The amendment, therefore, is not a substantive change to the existing attempt
statute, but a clarification that it includes a "knowing" attempt. Because the amendment
"'construes and clarifies'" the prior attempt statute, this Court should "'accept[ ] [it] as the
legislative declaration of the original act.'" State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah App.
1998) (quoting/rc reD.B., 925 P.2d 178, 182 n.5 (Utah App. 1996)).
The historical timing of the amendment also supports a conclusion that it was merely
intended to clarify the original meaning of the statute. Since at least 1982, Utah courts have
recognized an "intentional or knowing" attempted murder. In State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d
903,904-05 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court recognized the crime of attempted murder
for "intentionally or knowingly" attempting to cause the death of another—rejecting the
defendant's argument that attempted murder requires a "specific intent" to kill another. Ten
years later in State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 848 (Utah 1992), the supreme court refused to
recognize the crime of attempted depraved indifference murder. In doing so, the court
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rejected part of the reasoning of Maestas. Vigil, 842 P.2d at 848 n.5. However, the court
emphasized that "Maestas is still good law insofar as it authorizes prosecution for attempted
aggravated murder under the intentional or knowing formulation of section 76-5-202(1) or
attempted murder under the intentional or knowing formulation of section 75-5-203(l)(a)."
Id.
Following Vigil, Utah courts continued to recognize an "intentional or knowing"
attempted murder. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150,1157 (Utah 1991) (upholding
attempted murder conviction because "[t]he jury could certainly [have] inferred] from
[defendant's] statements .. . that [defendant] administered the [poison] with the necessary
intent or knowledge"); State v. White, 880 P.2d 18,23 (Utah App. 1994) (observing that only
remaining question for jury was whether defendant "had the intentional or knowing state of
mind required for conviction of attempted murder"); State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 642
(Utah 1997) (comparing the penalty for aggravated assault by a prisoner with that for
"attempted murder, which also requires an intent to kill or a knowledge that one's acts would
result in death if carried out"); Casey 1,2001 UT App 205, ^f 27 (recognizing an "intentional
or knowing" attempted murder).
Casey II, therefore, represents a departure from some twenty years of Utah case law
recognizing attempted murder under the "intentional or knowing" formulation of the statute.
Against this background, the Utah Legislature amended the attempt statute in the legislative
session immediately following Casey II

See S.B. 143 (Bill Status), available at

http://wwrw.le.state.utus/-2004/status/sbillsta/sb0143 .htm. The timing of the amendment, on
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the heels of Casey II, supports the conclusion that the legislature was clarifying a statute,
which had, for the first time, mistakenly been interpreted to exclude a "knowing" attempted
murder. In short, the 2004 amendment can only be construed as a "reaffirmation of a longstanding rule—a clarification—and not the intentional reversal of a [6-month] aberration."
City ofKanab v. Guskey, 965 P.2d 1065, 1069 n.3 (Utah App. 1998).
Because the amended statute applies retroactively to this case, the trial court did not
err in giving the attempt instructions.
B.

ANY ERROR WAS NOT OBVIOUS

Even assuming arguendo that the trial court improperly instructed the jury, a finding
of error only "begins [the Court's] analysis under the plain error test." Casey II, 2003 UT
33, Tf 43. The Court must still "determine whether th[e] error was obvious and whether it
was of sufficient magnitude to constitute plain error." Id. An error is obvious only if,
"'given the circumstances, the trial court should have been aware that an error was being
committed at the time.5" Id. (quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 n.l 1 (Utah 1989)).
In Casey II—which addressed an identical claim of plain error—the Supreme Court
concluded that the inclusion of a "knowing" mens rea in the attempt instruction was neither
plain, manifest, or obvious given the footnote in Vigil "indicating that 'Maestas is still good
law insofar as it authorizes prosecution for . . . attempted murder under the intentional or
knowing formulation of section 76-5-203(l)(a).'" Id. at 145 (quoting Vigil, 842 P.2d at 848
n.5). As such, the Court held, it "[could not] say that the error should have been plain or
obvious to the trial court." Id.
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Likewise, it cannot be said here that the inclusion of a "knowing" mens rea in the
attempt instructions was obvious. In this case, the trial court was not only guided by the
footnote in Vigil, but by this Court's decision in Casey I. Relying on Vigil, this Court
"conclude[d] that the required mental state for attempted murder under section 76-5203(l)(a) is intent or knowledge."5 Casey I, 2001 UT App 205,ffif17-14, 27. Although at
the time of trial in this case the Utah Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Casey I, its
decision in that case was still more than a year away. Under those circumstances, the trial
court was duty bound, even in the face of an objection, to instruct the jury that "the required
mental state for attempted murder under section 76-5-203(l)(a) is 'intent or knowledge."'
Id. at U 27. See Martin v. Cain, 206 F.3d 450,456 (5th Cir.) (holding that court is bound by
precedent until overruled or changed by law), cert, granted, judgment vacated on grounds
challenged, and case remanded, 531 U.S. 801, 121 S.Ct. 32 (2000); U.S. exrel. Daneffv.
Henderson, 501 F.2d 1180,1181 (2nd Cir. 1974) (holding that decision where certiorari has
been granted retains precedential value); United States v. Duncan, 456 F.2d 1401,1403 (9th
Cir.) (holding that it is bound by prior decision even though certiorari has been granted),
cert, granted, judgment vacated on grounds challenged, and case remanded, 409 U.S 814,
93 S.Ct. 161 (1972).
Because any error in the attempt instructions was not obvious, defendant's "manifest
injustice" exception fails. See Casey II, 2003 UT 33, \ 45.
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C.

ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS

Finally, defendant's argument fails in any event because no harm resulted in this case.
Under the final prong of the plain error test, defendant '"must show a reasonable likelihood
that absent the error, the outcome below would have been more favorable."5 Id. at \ 46
(quoting Verde, 770 P.2d at 122). Defendant has failed to meet this requirement.
Officer Worthen testified that after he stepped into the chicken coop, defendant arose
from behind a barrier of miscellaneous objects with a .32 caliber rifle to his shoulder, which
he pointed and fired at Officer Worthen's face. R.243:117-18,121-24,132; R. 244: 18-19,
247; R. 245: 43, 77. Officer Worthen testified that he avoided being shot only by dropping
to the ground just before defendant pulled the trigger. R.243: 123-24; R. 244: 18-19. The
State introduced evidence showing that the bullet entered the shed wall in a trajectory that
would have hit Officer Worthen had he not moved. R. 245:76-77. Officer Worthen testified
that as he scrambled away, defendant fired the rifle at him a second time, but again missed.
R.243:124-25,134. Officers Worthen and Clark both testified that defendant fired his rifle
at Officer Clark when Officer Clark peeked out from behind the corner of defendant's house,
and that the bullet came within two feet of his head. R. 243: 137-42; R. 244: 123-26, 13337,141-42. Officer Worthen testified that defendant repeatedly told him that "he was going
to shoot [him—Officer Worthen].55 R. 243: 144-45; R. 244: 24, 36.
Defendant, on the other hand, testified that he was a skilled marksman, would have
successfully shot the officers had he wished to, and that he only fired the weapon to prompt
the officers to shoot and kill him. R. 245: 205-06. He testified that when he fired his rifle
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the first time, he swung the rifle away from Officer Worthen and shot through the wall
"because if it was straight on, [he] didn't wanna [sic] hit him." R. 245: 202, 213, 234. He
testified that he carefully placed his shots so as not to hit the officers. R. 245: 205. He
testified that when he shot at Officer Clark, he "knew exactly where it was going," i.e., that
the round would miss the officer and hit the house. R. 245:206-07,243. Defendant further
testified that he "never did take aim at any officer" and that he "wasn't gonna [sic] shoot the
police." R. 245:210,229.
The jury was thus asked to decide between two factual versions: the State's version
that defendant intentionally attempted to kill the officers because he did not want to be
arrested and defendant's version that he shot away from the officers hoping to provoke them
into shooting him. On appeal, defendant suggests a third version—that defendant fired the
rifle knowing he would kill the officers, but intending that they shoot him in response. Aplt.
Brf. at 28. However, defendant did not suggest such a version below and no evidence was
presented supporting such a version. Because no evidence was introduced supporting a
finding of that version of facts, defendant's claim fails.
If the jury chose to believe defendant, it could not have found that defendant acted
with a knowing mental state, i.e., that when he fired the rifle "he [was] aware that his
conduct was reasonably certain to cause [the officers' deaths]." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2103(2) (1999). This is because defendant did not claim that he fired at the officers knowing
that they would be killed, but intending that they would shoot him in response. Rather, he

20

claimed that he fired his rifle away from the officers, intending that they would shoot him in
response. The jury rejected this claim.
Where the jury rejected defendant's "suicide by cop" claim—that he shot away from
the officers hoping that they shoot him—"no rational basis existed upon which [defendant's]
conduct could be considered knowing but not intentional in light of the evidence submitted at
trial." Casey, 2003 UT 33, f 47.
He *

*

Because defendant has not shown obvious, prejudicial error, his manifest injustice
claim fails.
II.

THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH DEFENDANT'S
INTENT TO CAUSE THE DEATH OF OFFICERS WORTHEN AND
CLARK
Defendant also claims that the evidence was insufficient to establish the required

mens rea element for attempt. Aplt. Brf. at 19-20, 24-25, 28-29. He contends that the trial
court plainly erred in not sua sponte entering a directed verdict of acquittal. Aplt. Brf. at 2125. His claim fails.
Because defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence below, he must
demonstrate plain error. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, «[fij 13-16, 10 P.3d 346. "[T]o
establish plain error, a defendant must demonstrate first that the evidence was insufficient to
support a conviction of the crime charged and second that the insufficiency was so obvious
and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." Id. at f 17. The
Utah Supreme Court in Holgate recognized that "it is difficult for the court on appeal to

21

dictate when an evidentiary defect was apparent to the trial court." Id. However, the Court
cited "the case in which the State presents no evidence to support an essential element of a
criminal charge" as an example of the kind of evidentiary defect that warrants reversal under
plain error. Id. (emphasis in original). No such evidentiary defect was present here.
As noted above, Officer Worthen testified that defendant aimed his rifle at the
officer's face and fired at him while he was in the chicken coop. R. 243: 117-18, 121-24,
132; R. 244:18-19,247; R. 245:43, 77. The officers testified that defendant fired his rifle at
Officer Clark when Officer Clark peeked out from behind the corner of the house. R. 243:
137-42; R. 244: 123-26,133-37,141-42. Defendant admitted that after hearing Mrs. Malan
call for police, he retrieved two loaded firearms and additional ammunition and entered the
chicken coop behind some barrels. See R. 245: 198-200, 229, 238. Although defendant
claimed at trial that he wanted to commit "suicide by cop," he never presented himself to be
shot by police during the standoff. See R. 243: 132-34, 146; R. 244: 128, 181, 226.
Moreover, Chief Jackson testified that defendant's verbal exchange with police was
"in a very menacing, mean-spirited tone," which suggested that he "wanted a piece of [Chief
Jackson] and anybody else." R. 244: 226. The evidence also established that defendant
challenged the officers to come in and get him. R.243:143-45; R. 244: 24-25,36,122,13132,139-40,224; R. 244:226 (yelling to Chief Jackson, "You f.ers just come in here and get
me"). And perhaps most damning, Officer Worthen testified that defendant repeatedly told
him that "he was going to shoot [Officer Worthen]." R. 243: 144-45; R. 244: 24, 36.
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The foregoing evidence was more than sufficient to establish that defendant not only
"knowingly" attempted to cause the officers5 deaths, but that he "intentionally" attempted to
cause their deaths. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789, 792 (Utah 1991) (holding jury could
infer intent from overall circumstances of murder). Defendant, therefore, has failed to show
any error, much less obvious error and his plain error claim for lack of evidence thus fails.
Defendant also claims that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not moving
for a directed verdict. Aplt. Brf. at 16-20. This claim also fails because the evidence was
sufficient and any motion for a directed verdict would have therefore been futile. See State
v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, f 34, 989 P.2d 52 (holding that failure of counsel to make futile
objections does not constitute ineffective assistance).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's convictions.
Respectfully submitted May 5, 2004.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

SY S. GRAY
riTsistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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S.B. 143

CRIMINAL OFFENSE ATTEMPT AMENDMENTS
2004 GENERAL SESSION
STATE OF UTAH

Sponsor: David L. Gladwell
LONG TITLE
General Description:
This bill clarifies the elements of an attempt to commit an offense.
Highlighted Provisions:
This bill:
•

clarifies that an attempt to commit a crime includes situations where the defendant is

aware that his actions are reasonably certain to cause a result that is an element of
the offense; and
•

clarifies that a defendant's conduct constitutes a substantial step toward committing

a crime if the conduct strongly corroborates the defendant's awareness of his actions
as described above.
Monies Appropriated in this Bill:
None
Other Special Clauses:
None
Utah Code Sections Affected:
AMENDS:
76-4-101, as enacted by Chapter 196, Laws of Utah 1973

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1. Section 76-4-101 is amended to read:
76-4-101. Attempt - Elements of offense.
(1) For purposes of this partA a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime iff;

S.B. 143

Enrolled Copy

(a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of [the offense]
the crime; and
(b) (i) intends to commit the crime: or
(ii) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he acts with an awareness
that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause that result.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct [docs not constitute] constitutes a substantial step
[unless it is strongly corroborative of] if it strongly corroborates the actor's [intent to commit the
offense] mental state as defined in Subsection (l)(b).
(3) [No] A defense to the offense of attempt [shdi] does not arise:
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been committed [had] if
the attendant circumstances had been as the actor believed them to be.
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